We had become gigantic in the eyes of computer buyers. In addition, we had become the world's largest semiconductor manufacturer, and we were growing faster than most large companies. So when problems developed with our flagship Pentium chip, our merchandising pointed the users directly back to us. By 1994, research showed that our "Intel Inside" logo had become one of the most recognised logos in consumer merchandising. Hundreds of manufacturers, domestic and international, participated in this campaign, and Intel spent a lot of money promoting the brand. Furthermore, since we generally didn't sell microprocessors to computer users but to computer makers, whatever problems we had in the past, we used to handle with the computer manufactures, engineer to engineer, based on data analysis.īut in 1991, Intel had introduced the "Intel Inside" program, a major merchandising campaign intended to give Intel distinction and an identity, and to help build computer-user communities' awareness of Intel and our products. We set our own quality levels and specifications, and shipped when we decided a product met our own criteria. For the twenty-six years, we had decided what was good and what wasn't when it came to our own products. "Intel learnt a lot from that issue previously, the firm had been the classic engineering-driven company. We asked Intel for some background on how the company lived through what could be called its first real PR crisis and Tom Waldrop, an Intel veteran who witnessed first-hand the drama unravel, was kind enough to contribute